Critical Red Hat Quay Flaw Lets Attackers Read and Overwrite All Private Container Images in a Registry
5 points by dasm
5 points by dasm
An anonymous token from Quay's /v2/auth endpoint passes: Quay signs it with a trusted key, and the caller chooses its audience.
Bit of an LLM smell here, though curiously I can't really seem to find many other sources that talk about both CVEs.
Either way, the direct links to them are
Key rotation authenticates the caller only by verifying that the JWT is signed by an already approved service key with the expected audience and issuer, without checking that the token is a rotation credential. An anonymous token minted by /v2/auth satisfies that check.
By creating a namespace whose name contains an underscore that collides with an existing one, the attacker causes the underscore to act as a single-character SQL LIKE wildcard, matching the victim's namespace. This allows the attacker to list and steal the victim's robot account tokens, then use them to read, push, or overwrite that tenant's container images.